Prepared Remarks of Gen. (Ret.) Rodolfo Garcia
Former Chairperson
GOP Negotiating Panel for the Talks with the MILF
[Presented at the public forum GRP-Moro Conflict: Is there an end in sight? Human Security and Human Development Revisited, held on September 19, 2009, 2-5pm at the UP School of Economics Auditorium, jointly organized by the Human Development Network and the UP School of Economics and sponsored by the UNDP]
Discussion
I have been asked to assess the current government policy on the Moro conflict, as implied or explicit in the GRP-MILF MOA-AD and its aftermath, against the recommendation of the 2005 PHDR; to evaluate if the recommendations were valid then and, with the current realities and as a way forward towards a peaceful resolution to the GRP-Moro conflict, to assess if those recommendations are still valid now.
When the PHDR Report of 2005 was issued with its recommendations, the Peace Process with the MILF was proceeding, but not without difficulty. Negotiations are inherently difficult, not “walks in the park”. Much, however, was accomplished in 2005 until August 2006 when talks got snagged over the Territory strand of the AD. The impasse was to last until November 2007, for more than one year. But typically in this on and off again protracted negotiations, and in accord with PHDR recommendations, negotiations continued overcoming these episodal impasses and breakdowns. Hopes were high as the hard negotiations were seen leading towards the MOA signing last 5 August 2008.
The MOA-AD, now dead, was in accord with the track proposed in PHDR 2005 – to give priority to the MILF negotiations. Uncannily so, because frankly the PHDR recommendations were not a reference point for the then Panel, which was chaired by Sec. Afable. By some bureaucratic lapse perhaps. The Panel, however, clearly saw the need that the PHDR had also seen: the urgency to foster a regime of Peace in troubled Mindanao thru principled negotiations which trajectory was to achieve a just political settlement of the Moro problem.
As the MOA showed, the Panel adopted an approach that refused to be boxed in by the oft-used traditional approaches and experiments of the past which were widely assessed to have failed to deliver on the aspirations of the Bangsamoro. It was a bold, out of the box tact that aimed to strike a balance between the legitimate aspirations of a minority people and the non-negotiable requirement of Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Panel which crafted the MOA acknowledged that the problem which had festered for long and caused so much destruction in lives and property and which impeded National Development and that of Mindanao, must be resolved and now. This could be the last opportunity presented to us to settle a lingering problem before the generation of leaders of the MILF whom we are dealing with fade away to give way to a younger generation of leaders, more impatient, deeply suspicious and distrustful of Government and with a more progressive, activist and possessed by a dangerous disposition. They will be harder to deal with, and imperils a shift from the current negotiation-oriented, pragmatic and tempered engagements with the MILF into a more forceful, radical and adverse-to-negotiations mindset in the assertion of the Bangsamoro peoples’ aspirations. Bravo and Kato typify this set. And there could be more of these segment in the MILF who could tilt to a new norm of behavior and methods in achieving their aspirations especially if negotiations fail to achieve any real concessions for the Bangsamoro people. There is an urgency to the task of negotiating, given that if negotiations get protracted or ultimately fail, the rise of this group may come to be and thus, the specter of more destructive confrontations and resultant damages may be greater than one can imagine: a quantum leap from the level of conflict we have known in the past. We might be seeing a new dimension of conflict inspired by new Jihadist activism.
To arrive at a workable, acceptable prescription to deep-seated problem, our mindsets must be freed from restraints that normally in the past had fenced in negotiations to parameters that restrict/limit the possibilities of a genuine solution to a problem. We opened ourselves to possibilities available for truly solving a problem that has deep historical roots, recognizing that our Moro brothers have a unique identity and culture. The possibilities we explored find expression in the provisions of the MOA, even if it is merely a preliminary agreement, a codification of consensus points many aspects of which still has to be negotiated leading to a Final Peace Agreement.
It is now a much demonized document that has been called by many names: a sell-out, a dismemberment of the Republic, a virtual grant of independence to the Bangsamoro. It is attacked as being unconstitutional. The Panel, shouts its oppositors, are guilty of treason.
I take comfort in the PHDR recommendations and the intriguing truths it has discovered in its research. It had highlighted what to me are the fundamental moral underpinnings of why the Bangsamoro problem has to be taken by the horns, to be solved and restitutions made to the historical injustices, past policy errors and current prejudices our Moro brothers were inflicted with.
The MOA stands on defensible legal grounds. Our team of legal experts can stand up to the legal challenges. The moral dimension, however, had been pushed to the margins and had not been given the merit it deserves. Many are hardly aware of this important dimension. And yet this is the dimension that gives any decent person the moral imperative to act, if justice is to be dispensed, if fear, want, indignity and humiliation can be addressed and corrected.
This is why I see good sense in building a Peace Constituency. The MOA controversy had for a while brought the prevailing insecurity in the South back into the headlines, and into public conversations and debate. If the PHDR recommendations on building a peace constituency had taken root or if a parallel track had been in place through a much earlier conscious Government effort in this direction, perhaps the MOA could not have been bedeviled for what it is not. Perhaps many unfounded suspicions and fears stoked by its oppositors could not have resulted to shrill, hysteric outcries. A public with a fair understanding of the roots of the Moro problem, aware of the injustice and indignity suffered by a people, aggravated by poverty, deprivation and ignorance engendered by the inadequacy of opportunities or of opportunities denied, will not be taken in by politically motivated posturings and machinated exaggerations. But even as we wade through an uncertain period, the opening of discourse brought about by a smoldering issue that is now merely simmering, about to get lost in public consciousness as fresh public controversies take over public’s attention (we seem to just go from one controversial issue to another, as part of media entertainment fare), must be followed-up and built upon. Perhaps we should build up from ashes of the MOA and keep the public discourse going in the areas directly concerned and to nationwide constituency. Through engagements with the civil society organizations, national communities, schools, the vital influential sectors (business, religious, the academe, sectors with a stake and which will reap the dividends of peace) the momentum could be maintained. The interest the MOA triggered presents a real opportunity, a positive momentum to generate awareness and build a constituency for peace. This constituency will be a powerful force, knowledgeable and can lend the needed sober, balancing influence for the tearful, the emotional, yet hardly informed segments of society.
The harsh reality we have to accept is that this is a minority-majority issue: of a minority aspirations trapped by the obvious supremacy of the majority (tyranny of the majority?). Does not the Constitution intend to give justice to a people wronged? Does not it have the means to restitute grievances in the interest of a higher goal—national unity? If that is not so, how then can a minority’s aspiration be realized? Must such aspiration be muzzled, chained forever at the fringes of our collective consciousness? Do we tempt the harsher options we allow to happen by denying such aspirations? This is one reason that I support dovetailing the Peace Process with Charter Change. It is because the Constitution gives hope.
On the other points of the PHDR recommendations:
- Policy Coherence
- Legislating a Peace Policy
- Key Reforms (electoral process, security sector)
- Undertake Human Development Investments for their own sake
As to the major question posed by this Forum, is there an end in sight on the GRP-Moro Conflict? I will take an optimistic position. Having reached this far and accomplished so much – and even as the process is in limbo, the negotiations track is not yet clinically dead. It still beats, but faintly, it can be resuscitated and nursed to a regular heartbeat. It may take some more time now, but it surely should not be abandoned. Hope should spring eternal. But hope they say it is not a method. We must audaciously give muscle to our hopes. Our collective voices are needed to give resumption of this vital process a much needed push. Or a shove. (End.)
